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The Constitutional Bond in Military Professionalism: 




In May 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was the 
commencement speaker for graduation ceremonies at the Naval Academy 
and the Air Force Academy.  Midshipmen and cadets take an oath
1
 upon 
graduation to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, and 
Secretary Gates gave the soon-to-be-commissioned officers a short lesson in 
constitutional structure.  He said, 
  The Congress is a co-equal branch of government that under the 
Constitution raises armies and provides for navies.  Members of both 
parties now serving in Congress have long been strong supporters of 
the Department of Defense, and of our men and women in uniform.  
As officers, you will have a responsibility to communicate to those 
below you that the American military must be non-political and 
recognize the obligation we owe the Congress to be honest and true in 




 * Professor of Law and Gerald A. Sohn Research Scholar, University of Florida Levin College 
of Law; Aircraft and Munitions Maintenance Officer, United States Air Force, 1979–1983. 
1. Commissioned military officers must swear or affirm they “will support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic” and “bear true faith and 
allegiance to the same.”  5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2006). 
2. Robert M. Gates, U.S. Sec’y of Def., United States Naval Academy Commencement 
Remarks (May 25, 2007); Robert M. Gates, U.S. Sec’y of Def., United States Air Force Academy 
Commencement Remarks (May 30, 2007).  The Secretary’s constitutional lesson was the same at 
each event, except that at the Air Force Academy he added an interpretive gloss to Article I, Section 
Eight, Clause Thirteen, stating that Congress provides for both “navies and air forces.”  Id. 
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Does it surprise you that the Secretary of Defense felt the need to 
remind graduates of their professional obligation to Congress under Article I 
of the Constitution?  Perhaps it should not, especially after reading 
Deborah N. Pearlstein’s The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of 
Powers.
3
  Professor Pearlstein examines theoretical models for understanding 
civilian control of the military that are standards of political science but have 
only more recently spilled over into law.
4
  These models are notable for their 
curious and consistent assumption that our constitutional separation of 
powers within the federal government is inherently damaging to civilian 
control and military professionalism.
5
  Legal scholars have had relatively 
little interest in theorizing about constitutional control of military forces—as 
opposed to the popular emphasis on the power to declare war
6—and so little 
has been said about this puzzling inconsistency between constitutional 
structure and the dominant teachings of political science. 
The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of Powers is important and 
very persuasive.  (In this Response, I will call it Separation of Powers to 
distinguish it clearly from The Soldier and the State,
7
 the classic work on 
civil–military relations referenced in the title.)  Professor Pearlstein asks the 
right questions and reaches the right conclusions—no small task when law 
professors have typically deferred to expertise in other fields, if not avoided 
the subject entirely.
8
  What do we mean by civilian control of the military?  
Where is the line between a military that offers its professional expertise to 
civilian decision makers and a military that wields undue influence in those 
decisions?  Is strong civilian control inconsistent with a constitutional 
structure that separates power over the military among the three branches of 
federal government?  Separation of Powers convincingly dismantles the 
political orthodoxy that a professional military cannot thrive when its 
principals—legislative, executive, and judicial—share constitutional 
authority.  It rightly concludes that any proper theory of civilian control must 
acknowledge and affirm our constitutional structure because, first, such an 
interpretation is faithful to constitutional text, and second, separation of 




3. Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of Powers, 90 TEXAS L. 
REV. 797 (2012). 
4. Id. at 801. 
5. Id. 
6. See generally, e.g., JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND: A HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER 
FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH (2010) (explaining the debate about the nature 
of presidential power with special emphasis on war powers). 
7. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF 
CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS (1957). 
8. A notable exception is the following insightful article: Geoffrey Corn and Eric Talbot Jensen, 
The Political Balance of Power Over the Military: Rethinking the Relationship Between the Armed 
Forces, The President, and Congress, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 553 (2007). 
9. Pearlstein, supra note 3, at 857. 
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I have argued in a recent book, A More Perfect Military: How the 
Constitution Can Make Our Military Stronger, that the military’s traditional 
bond to constitutional ideals is an essential part of military professionalism 
and military effectiveness,
10
 a theme that aligns perfectly with Professor 
Pearlstein’s conclusions about civilian control in Separation of Powers.  
I have no important disagreements with her analysis.  As a result, my focus 
in this Response will be to expand perspective and add larger context.  First, 
there is a reason conventional political theory on civilian control of the 
military fails to work well as a model for constitutional analysis.  Separation 
of Powers takes the standard work in civil–military relations at face value—
which is generous and neutral as a scholarly matter—but as a result, it 
understates the extremism of the work’s Cold War foundations.  Second, 
Separation of Powers focuses primarily on the classic problem posed by 
weak civilian control: the danger that the military will overreach or exercise 
undue influence in decisions that should be made by civilians.  I argue this is 
the lesser of dangers we face from weak civilian control.  More likely is the 
risk that civilians will take political advantage of a broken system to suppress 
information necessary for making informed democratic decisions.  Today, 
civilian control is more about control of information related to the military 
than it is about control of the military itself.  This is further complicated by 
an inability to distinguish between what is professional military expertise and 
what is not.  Civilians tend to be the primary offenders in a system of weak 
civilian control, although their actions are inevitably corrosive to military 
ethics and professionalism. 
I. Where It All Began 
As Separation of Powers explains, the classic work of political theory in 
the field of civil–military relations is Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier 
and the State, published in 1957.
11
  His contribution to understanding civilian 
control of the military was to distinguish between what he called “subjective” 
civilian control and “objective” civilian control—the former deemed 
unworkable and the latter embraced as essential to a professional military.
12
  
Subjective civilian control of the military was dependent on shared bonds 
between the military and civilian society, ensuring that the military would 
reflect values of the larger community.  In Huntington’s words, subjective 
civilian control worked by “civilianizing the military, making them the 
 
10. DIANE H. MAZUR, A MORE PERFECT MILITARY: HOW THE CONSTITUTION CAN MAKE 
OUR MILITARY STRONGER 12 (2010). 
11. Pearlstein, supra note 3, at 805 (citing HUNTINGTON, supra note 7). 
12. HUNTINGTON, supra note 7, at 80–85. 
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mirror of the state.”13  Objective civilian control, on the other hand, worked 
by “militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state.”14 
Huntington made the choice between subjective and objective control 
seem so obvious.  Objective civilian control would maximize military 
professionalism; subjective civilian control meant the military would be 
forever ensnarled in politics.
15
  How could anyone disagree?  Who would 
argue for a less professional military, or for a more political military?  
Huntington’s views on military professionalism and politics, however, came 
packaged in radical assumptions about the nature of the military and its place 
in American society.  He believed a military could be professional only if it 
was distinctly different from the civilian world and operated in its own 
autonomous, constitutionally independent sphere.  Unlike the World War II 
military of only a few years before, Huntington sought a military that was not 
representative of civilian society and its values.
16
  Huntington also used 
“politics” as a code word for our constitutional system in general.17  In his 
view, the only way to take politics out of the military was to take the military 
out of the Constitution.
18
 
Taking the military out of the Constitution might not be such a problem, 
perhaps, if the military had never been in the Constitution.  Huntington 
seemed to run off the constitutional rails when he concluded that “[t]he 
United States Constitution, despite the widespread belief to the contrary, 
does not provide for civilian control.”19  This seems difficult to digest, given 
the Constitution’s comprehensive framework for control of military forces:  
in Article I, Congress’s power to declare war, raise and support armies (with 
biennial control of appropriations), provide and maintain a navy, make rules 
for the government and regulation of the military, decide if and when to call 
forth the militia of the states into federal service and provide for organizing, 
arming, and disciplining them, together with the less frequently mentioned 
powers to define and punish offenses against the law of nations and make 
 
13. Id. at 83. 
14. Id. 
15. See id. (“The antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in politics: 
civilian control decreases as the military become progressively involved in institutional, class, and 
constitutional politics.”). 
16. Huntington even condemned the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), the best 
opportunity we have to foster diversity of thought in military leadership and a productive 
engagement between civilian and military viewpoints.  See id. at 282–88 (referring to ROTC and 
other post-World War I military training programs as an “abortive identification with society”). 
17. See, e.g., id. at 177 (“The separation of powers is a perpetual invitation, if not an irresistible 
force, drawing military leaders into political conflicts.”). 
18. Id. at 191. 
19. Id. at 163.  The Supreme Court would likely disagree.  See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 
(1972) (finding a tradition of resistance to military intrusion into civilian life “in the Third 
Amendment’s explicit prohibition against quartering soldiers in private homes without consent and 
in the constitutional provisions for civilian control of the military”). 




 in Article II, the president’s power as 
commander in chief of our military forces;
21
 and in Article III, the power of 
federal courts to decide all cases arising under the Constitution and the laws 
of the United States—including cases involving the military.22  This is an 
extensive range of civilian involvement for a Constitution that supposedly 
does not provide for civilian control.  What Huntington meant, however, was 
that the Constitution did not incorporate his very idiosyncratic version of 
civilian control, one that required civilians to recognize “autonomous 
military professionalism” and “an independent military sphere.”23  How 
idiosyncratic was his vision?  He thought Congress had stepped over the line 
when it passed the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
24
 normally hailed as the 




Huntington’s theory of objective civilian control was as much a 
complaint about the values of the United States and its governing document 
as anything else.  He repeatedly pointed to liberalism as the enemy of 
military professionalism,
26
 and by liberalism he did not mean the ideology 
that separates modern Democrats and Republicans.  His grievance was 
against our democratic liberalism in the broadest sense and its respect for 
individual constitutional liberty.
27
  He charged that liberalism was 
“inherently antimilitary,”28 “united in its hostility to the military 
profession,”29 and ultimately “the gravest domestic threat to American 
military security.”30  The Soldier and the State is quite extreme in its distrust 
of civilian constitutional values.  If unconvinced, consider that Huntington 
praised the antebellum South as one of only two genuinely conservative 
groups in American history, the Federalists of 1789–1812 being the other.31  
“Unlike the Federalists,” Huntington added, “the Southerners had good 
grounds for their domestic fears.  The slaveowners were the only significant 
 
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 10–16. 
21. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
22. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
23. HUNTINGTON, supra note 7, at 83. 
24. See id. at 461 (criticizing the UCMJ as an “encroachment upon the integrity and status of 
the officer corps”). 
25. See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (relying heavily on the UCMJ in 
evaluating detainee procedures). 
26. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 7, at 154 (arguing that “American liberalism . . . identif[ies] 
its external and domestic enemies with military professionalism”). 
27. See id. at 90 (characterizing liberalism as “emphasiz[ing] the reason and moral dignity of 
the individual and oppos[ing] political, economic, and social restraints upon individual liberty”). 
28. Id. at 94. 
29. Id. at 153. 
30. Id. at 457. 
31. Id. at 146–47. 
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social group in the history of the United States ever to be forcibly 
dispossessed of their property.”32 
Military professionalism, according to Huntington, depended on 
distancing the military from the professionally inappropriate values of 
civilians.
33
  For this reason, it was necessary to minimize the role that 
constitutional text assigned to Congress and other institutions closely 
identified with the people.  True military professionalism was possible only 
if the President, as Commander in Chief, served as the single source of 
authority over the military.
34
  Our constitutional system of shared authority 
over the military was disruptive to this strict chain of command and therefore 
“an ever present threat to the symmetry and order of the military hierarchy,” 
placing military professionalism and civilian control at risk.
35
  Huntington 
concluded that congressional authority (not to mention judicial authority, and 
he did not) had “made it impossible for American officers ever to be at ease 
in their professionalism.”36 
Professor Pearlstein notes the striking inconsistency within orthodox 
political theory of civilian control.  She writes, “For a Constitution that 
seems so self-consciously to have allocated power over military affairs to 
several branches of civilian government, it seems odd that dominant 
understandings of civilian control chafe so much at the constitutional 
structure itself.”37  “Odd” is surely an understatement.  It is difficult to take 
Huntington’s work seriously as a basis for understanding constitutional 




32. Id. at 147. 
33. See id. at 266–69, 309–12, 464–66 (reciting a litany of dissatisfaction with American 
civilian values). 
34. See id. at 35 (contending that “a single recognized source of legitimate authority over the 
military forces” is necessary to professionalism in the military). 
35. Id. at 259.  Huntington could not see a place for Congress in the chain of civilian control’s 
constitutional order because Congress had no place in the chain of military command: “The new 
American professional officer had an inbred respect for the integrity of the chain of command 
stretching from the President as Commander in Chief to the lowest enlisted man.  No place existed 
in this picture for Congress.”  Id.  He returned to this theme again and again, never questioning his 
belief that constitutional structure had to mimic military structure.  Separation of powers was “a 
major hindrance to the development of military professionalism and civilian control,” a “real 
constitutional stumbling block,” and “the only really significant institution complicating the 
achievement of civilian control and military professionalism.”  Id. at 177, 191, 457.  Huntington 
really did not think much of Congress and the courts, at least as participants in civilian control. 
36. Id. at 184. 
37. Pearlstein, supra note 3, at 827. 
38. In recognition of the fiftieth anniversary of Huntington’s work, the United States Military 
Academy at West Point sponsored a research project “that would amplify for this twenty-first-
century generation of students, both graduate and undergraduate, the remarkable contribution that 
Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State (1957) has made, and continues to make, to the 
study of civil-military relations,” culminating in a book of essays on civilian control.  AMERICAN 
CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS: THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE IN A NEW ERA xvii (Suzanne C. 
Nielson & Don M. Snider eds., 2009). 
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and it forms the foundation for current arguments that the president has 
unfettered constitutional authority to control the military and its activities.  
The theory of objective civilian control is fundamentally grounded in 
resistance to the Constitution, not its support or defense, and as a result, the 
actors responsible for civilian control of the military—both civilian and 
military—invariably find themselves searching for ways to evade or excuse 
constitutional structure and text.  More than fifty years after Huntington, we 
are still questioning whether faithfulness to the Constitution is the enemy of 
military effectiveness and professionalism. 
II. Where We Are Today 
Huntington could not have anticipated how closely the military would 
come to resemble his vision of an institution distant and distinct from civilian 
America.  Despite more than a decade of war—the longest engagement in 
our history—only one-half of 1% of the American public serves in the post-
September 11 military.
39
  One of the most active fields of military study 
today is the civil–military gap: the divide of experience and culture between 
the military and civilian America.
40
  The end of the draft has left the military 
far less representative of civilian society, from the top to the bottom of the 
ranks.
41
  The system has banished the last remnants of Huntington’s 
subjective civilian control, a model dependent on a citizenry that engages 
military issues in the public square. 
The effect of this civil–military shift has been profound.  The all-
volunteer military has created a military fantasy that is difficult to control or 
correct.
42
  Civilian society is less informed and less invested in issues 
involving the military,
43
 and this imbalance of responsibility has in turn made 
the military more resentful of civilian intrusion and less open to civilian 
 
39. PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE MILITARY–CIVILIAN GAP: WAR AND SACRIFICE IN THE POST-
9/11 ERA 8 (2011). 
40. See, e.g., MAZUR, supra note 10, at 42–52 (explaining origin of the gap from a legal 
perspective); id. at 8–9 (surveying veterans and civilians); THOMAS E. RICKS, MAKING THE CORPS 
23 (1997) (noting the gap while providing an account of Marine Corps basic training); see also 
generally SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE CIVIL–MILITARY GAP AND AMERICAN NATIONAL 
SECURITY (Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn eds., 2001) (compiling research based on a major 
study of the gap). 
41. The shift from a draft-assisted to an all-volunteer force surpassed Huntington’s 
expectations.  He assumed the enlisted ranks would remain representative of society while the 
professional officer corps grew more distant.  See HUNTINGTON, supra note 7, at 38–39 (explaining 
that enlisted men would be “a cross section of the national population” while officers would be “a 
separate professional group living in a world of their own with few ties to outside society”). 
42. See generally ANDREW J. BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM: HOW AMERICANS 
ARE SEDUCED BY WAR (2005) (revealing common misunderstandings about the military that have 
fueled militarism and undermined national security). 
43. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 39, at 64 (conducting a survey in which both civilians 
and veterans agreed that civilians do not understand the problems facing the military). 




  We paper over this uneasy atmosphere with ostentatious 
displays of respect and admiration for the military, perhaps with the 
unspoken agreement that those who do not serve have not earned the right to 
speak with any substance.  We fail to enforce boundaries between military 
and civilian influence and prerogative, partly because we no longer 
understand the military well enough to know where the line is and partly 
because we have been encouraged to believe that military competence 
exceeds civilian competence.
45
  These developments have created the perfect 
storm of distorted civilian control. 
The key question in Separation of Powers is whether military advice 
constrains the choices of civilian leaders in ways that undermine civilian 
control of the military.  One assumption behind the question, of course, is 
that the very expression of military advice can constrain civilian choice 
because civilians find it uncomfortable or politically disadvantageous to 
make decisions that are inconsistent with that advice.  The problem is 
magnified when the advice is open to public view in testimony before 
Congress or in defense of clients before military courts.  This was the core of 
Huntington’s complaint about separation of powers.  If the Executive Branch 
had a monopoly on civilian control, we would not have these embarrassing 
revelations of disagreement between the Commander in Chief and his 
military subordinates. 
Separation of Powers examines civilian control and separation of 
powers in the functional context of military lawyers who did not agree when 
Executive Branch civilians said the military could disregard statutory 
prohibitions on torture and abuse of prisoners.
46
  The author of the infamous 
“torture memos,” John Yoo of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal 
Counsel, fortified his legal analysis with the accusation that military lawyers 
undermined civilian control by revealing disagreement with their 
Commander in Chief in legislative or judicial settings.
47
  According to Yoo, 
 
44. See, e.g., id. at 3 (quoting the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stating that the 
nation’s civilians “do not know” the military and “do not comprehend the full weight of the burden 
we carry or the price we pay when we return home from battle”). 
45. See Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Deputy Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force, 
Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 341, 342 (1994) (“Rather than resisting military intrusion into civilian affairs, Americans turn 
to the armed forces ever more frequently to provide answers when conventional political 
methodologies fail.”).  Dunlap, recently retired, also wrote a satirical but deadly serious treatment of 
an American society that loves the military so much it abandons civilian control entirely.  Maj. Gen. 
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012, PARAMETERS, Winter 
1992–1993, at 2.  Like George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four probably was in 1984, Dunlap’s 
article seems especially ominous today. 
46. Pearlstein, supra note 3, at 803–04. 
47. Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A Rational 
Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1832 (2007).  But see Victor 
Hansen, Understanding the Role of Military Lawyers in the War on Terror: A Response to the 
Perceived Crisis in Civil–Military Relations, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 617, 621 (2009) (“[W]hen Sulmasy 
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military lawyers tried to gain improper advantage by stepping outside the 
chain of command and encouraging division among constitutional 
principals.
48
  His criticism evoked the common complaint that children gain 
an improper advantage by playing one parent against the other, but the 
parent–child ploy works only because each parent is reluctant to undercut the 
other’s authority.  In the case of the torture memos, the problem was not that 
the Executive Branch was reluctant to disagree publicly with Congress but 
that it was reluctant to disagree publicly with the military.
49
  Its solution was 
to package and present “military” information in a way that seemed to 
support presidential preference.
50
  Military lawyers were not the bad actors in 
this story of civilian control, nor did they execute “end runs” around the 
President.  The bad actors were civilians who attempted to suppress 




Commander in chief of the military does not mean civilian in chief of 
the various constitutional actors tasked with civilian control.
52
  This 
misguided reliance on the sanctity of the military chain of command despite 
constitutional structure to the contrary is the greatest flaw in the traditional 
political theory of civilian control.  It has also become a central feature of 
 
and Yoo refer to civilian control of the military, what they are really arguing for is politicization of 
the military by one branch of government.”). 
48. Sulmasy & Yoo, supra note 47, at 1832. 
49. See Pearlstein, supra note 3, at 819 (explaining that civilian elected officials capitulated to 
military preferences in an effort to avoid public disapproval). 
50. Id. 
51. Decisions about escalating the Vietnam War were similarly made on the basis of “contrived 
consensus” between civilians and their military advisors, and the military’s failure to object is now 
remembered as a devastating breach of professional obligation.  See H.R. MCMASTER, 
DERELICTION OF DUTY: LYNDON JOHNSON, ROBERT MCNAMARA, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 
AND THE LIES THAT LED TO VIETNAM 154 (1997) (“[C]ontrived consensus between the president 
and his civilian and military advisers would permit planning for the Americanization of the war 
without full consideration of the potential costs and consequences.”); see also id. at 329 (“Rather 
than advice[,] [Secretary of Defense Robert] McNamara and [President Lyndon] Johnson extracted 
from the [Joint Chiefs] acquiescence and silent support for decisions already made.”). 
52. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643–44 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he Constitution did not contemplate that the title Commander in Chief of the Army 
and Navy will constitute him also Commander in Chief of the country, its industries and its 
inhabitants.”).  The word commander is best understood for its plain military meaning.  See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 417–18 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining that 
the Commander in Chief acts only “as first General and admiral”).  No one would contend that 
senior generals and admirals have discretion to disregard federal law as a function of their command 
authority, and so why should the “first” among them have any greater discretion?  Constitutional 
scholars have typically not considered plain military meaning when construing the Commander in 
Chief Clause.  See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the 
Lowest Ebb: Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 
770 (2008) (arguing that the Commander in Chief Clause “does not preclude” a recognition of 
substantive war powers vested in the President); David Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 
81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 483 (2008) (concluding that the Commander in Chief Clause “tells us 
nothing about what the commander in chief power encompasses”). 
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civilian control in operation, because it offers a convenient justification for 
controlling information about the military.  If the President can use 
commander-in-chief authority to bottle up conflicting advice within the chain 
of command, it will never become part of the public debate.  A divided 
principal is therefore a safeguard against manufacture of an apparent military 
endorsement that hides actual military dissent, not a threat to civilian control.  
With separated powers, it is much more difficult to play “the military card” 
and succeed.  Is it really a problem for civilian control—an undue military 
constraint—if the President is forced into a different policy choice because 
he cannot conceal the fact that his decision went against military advice?  Is 
it bad for civilian control if civilian actors have the obligation to explain to 
the electorate or to other branches of government why they chose to act 
against military advice? 
Public opinion about the value of torture in interrogation, for example, 
could be decidedly less positive
53
 if civilians understood how strongly 
military professionals opposed it.  Top military lawyers understood that 
torture and abuse of prisoners would undermine military effectiveness and be 
a colossal mistake.  Decades of hard-won experience had taught the military 
that abusive conduct in interrogation hurts the war effort, puts our own 
service members at risk of retaliation, and most simply, does not work 
because it produces unreliable information.
54
  When these senior officers 
objected to civilian intentions, they were excluded from a Department of 
Defense working group that later produced a report making no reference to 
military concerns.
55
  It was the best of both worlds for the Executive Branch.  
It now had a defense-working-group report confirming its interrogation 
policy and dressed with the veneer of military input and consensus, even 
though the report reflected no actual military expertise and reached a 
conclusion contrary to what the military would have recommended.  The 
same motivation has animated periodic attempts to require military lawyers 
to conform their legal advice to the opinions of civilian lawyers in the 
Department of Defense.
56
  What gets lost is the fact that advice is no longer 
“advice” when someone can order what the advice should be, especially 
 
53. See Pearlstein, supra note 3, at 856. 
54. MAZUR, supra note 10, at 120–24; U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, 
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS 5-21, 5-26 (2006). 
55. S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., 110TH CONG., INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF 
DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY xxi–xxii (Comm. Print 2008); CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE 
RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 179–81 
(2007); Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: 
Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations (Apr. 4, 2003), reprinted in 
THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel 
eds., 2005).  The legal opinions forming the basis for the Working Group Report were later 
withdrawn.  JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 142–43, 146 (2007). 
56. SAVAGE, supra note 55, at 282–89; Pearlstein, supra note 3, at 801. 
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when the President is likely to then assure the American people that his 




Is it the military that constrains presidential initiative, or it is 
information about the military that constrains presidential initiative?  It is 
almost always the latter in our fractured system of civilian control.  If 
civilians were not so squeamish about disagreeing publicly with military 
advice—they are, after all, in charge in a system based on civilian control—it 
would quickly lose its disproportionate influence.  We would not be so 
concerned if dissenting military opinion entered public debate.  If civilians 
were better at distinguishing between what is military expertise and what is 
not, we could more easily disregard military opinion that is little more than 
“I’m in the military, and I have an opinion.”  We should not have relied so 
unthinkingly, for example, on ostensible military expertise regarding the 
need for “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” when a less obsequious approach would 
have revealed that the military had no expertise on the issue and disregarded 
the data it did have.
58
  Conversely, if civilians were better at recognizing the 
proper sphere of military expertise, we would not shrink from fully airing 
that expertise even if some civilians found the information politically 
inconvenient.  The opposition of military lawyers to the torture and abuse of 
prisoners was not a mere “policy” disagreement outside the military realm.59  
Military lawyers are military officers as well, and they understood how this 
misconduct would undermine military effectiveness.  They also had an 
obligation to ensure that members of the military complied with law.  If 
 
57. An article published in a premier journal of military study, written by a professor at the Air 
Force Academy, argued that military officers have an obligation to shape their testimony to 
Congress in order to conceal any disagreement between military advice and presidential preference.  
Damon Coletta, Courage in the Service of Virtue: The Case of General Shinseki’s Testimony Before 
the Iraq War, 34 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 109 (2007).  In loyalty to their Commander in Chief, 
Professor Coletta argued, the officers should help maintain an appearance that the president was 
following military advice even when he was not.  Id. at 118–19.  Coletta criticized testimony by 
Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki concerning the size of the force necessary to stabilize Iraq.  
“Shinseki’s testimony made it appear as if civilian leaders either dismissed what the military ‘knew’ 
or intentionally misled allies, not to mention Congress, about U.S. strategic objectives.”  Id. at 116.  
As a matter of military professionalism and constitutional faithfulness, however, Coletta could not 
be more wrong.  See Corn & Jensen, supra note 8, at 594 (recognizing that the military’s 
professional obligation extends to the government as a whole, not only to the Commander in Chief, 
and that “this duty cannot be compromised in the interest of placating one branch in favor of the 
other”). 
58. Rear Admiral John Hutson, a member of the 1993 military working group that 
recommended a ban on gay service members, later said this about the process:  “And the decisions 
were based on nothing.  It wasn’t empirical, it wasn’t studied, it was completely visceral, 
intuitive. . . .  It was ridiculous, it was all by the seat of our pants.”  In the end, “we were all 
opposed to it because we’re all opposed to it.”  NATHANIEL FRANK, UNFRIENDLY FIRE: HOW THE 
GAY BAN UNDERMINES THE MILITARY AND WEAKENS AMERICA 122–23 (2009). 
59. Contra Sulmasy and Yoo, supra note 47, at 1831–33 (referring to military concerns about 
the legality of interrogation methods as mere “policy preferences”). 
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civilians saw the military as part of our constitutional ideal, not apart from it, 
we would worry much less that we were undermining civilian control by 
allowing dissenting military opinion to be heard in all three branches of 
government. 
III. Conclusion 
What does it mean to have strong civilian control?  The answer can be 
found in a strict principle of accountability.  Professor Pearlstein is exactly 
right when she concludes that our constitutional separation of powers was 
intended to enhance accountability in how we manage the military by 
expanding the circumstances in which information necessary for 
representative decision making could emerge.
60
  There is no constitutional 
accountability for civilian control without candid military advice that is 
transparent and properly limited to matters of professional military expertise.  
Huntington was wrong in thinking that separation of powers thrusts the 
military into politics.  A system of separated powers does not make the 
military more political, but it does ensure that political decisions about the 
military will be more public. 
Civilian control does not depend on building an appealing veneer of 
consensus between military advice and civilian preference.  In fact, when 
civilians package military misinformation for political advantage, or when 
military leaders look the other way when civilians misrepresent military 
advice, they weaken civilian control and undermine military professionalism.  
Civilian control does depend on a politically neutral military, but the 
Constitution itself provides the necessary framework for neutrality.  Civilian 
control is strong when there is robust, even messy, sharing of civilian 
constitutional authority among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial 
Branches of government.  Civilian control is strong when it generates, not 
suppresses, candid advice on military subjects.  Most importantly, civilian 
control is strong when civilians can directly engage and openly disagree with 
military advice, if necessary, without the exchange being seen as 
embarrassing, rude, or unpatriotic.  This is the vision of civilian control that 
keeps the military an integral part of our constitutional design. 
 
60. Pearlstein, supra note 3, at 848–49. 
